CHARLESTON, W.Va. – Yesterday, U.S. Senator Shelley Moore Capito (R-W.Va.), a member of the Senate Homeland Security Appropriations Subcommittee, sent a letter to U.S. Department of Homeland Security (DHS) Secretary Alejandro Mayorkas and Acting United States Secret Service (USSS) Director Ronald L. Rowe, Jr. highlighting concerns she has about a recently published bipartisan interim report by the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee (HSGAC).
This report alleges critical, life-and-death communications breakdowns among local, state, and federal law enforcement, including the USSS, which resulted in a near-assassination of former President Donald Trump to occur in Butler, Pa. on July 13, 2024.
“The Interim Joint Report released by the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee and the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations detailed multiple shortfalls in the way that the United States Secret Service (USSS) communicated amongst themselves, as well as their communications with state and local law enforcement charged with securing the perimeter,” Senator Capito wrote.
Full text of Senator Capito’s letter can be found here or below:
The full HSGAC interim report can be found here.
Dear Secretary Mayorkas and Acting Director Rowe,
I write today regarding the multiple communications failures that led to the first assassination attempt against President Donald Trump.
The Interim Joint Report released by the Senate Homeland Security and Government Affairs Committee and the Permanent Subcommittee on Investigations detailed multiple shortfalls in the way that the United States Secret Service (USSS) communicated amongst themselves, as well as their communications with state and local law enforcement charged with securing the perimeter.
The report recommends that the Department of Homeland Security and USSS evaluate the proper steps they need to take that will ensure communications between federal, state and local law enforcement agencies, as well as first responders, are compatible with each other. The inability for state and local law enforcement partners, charged with securing the perimeter, to communicate with the USSS and the counter sniper teams is a significant reason for ultimate failure of the mission.
I recognize the critical partnership between the USSS and various state, local and federal law enforcement agencies in the event of large-scale joint security operations. To improve communications, it is vital that the USSS study the viability of and implement a shared interoperable communications platform with mesh network technologies that have been operationally deployed in other agencies to provide fundamental interoperability and shared situational awareness such as precise position location information, text communications, and other critical tools.
With many critical national security events scheduled to be held in the coming weeks and months, it is imperative that USSS quickly identify and adopt technology to close all gaps in communications between state, local, and other federal law enforcement agencies.
Thank you for your consideration.
Sincerely,
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